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1 Motivation and previous research
The economy is characterized by heterogeneity. The behaviour of economic agents
– households, firms – can be very diverse, based on their characteristics. The het-
erogeneous behaviour of economic agents can affect the conduct of economic policy
as well. Decisions affecting the allocation of resources can have different welfare
effects across sectors. For example, a tax on production can lead to different dead-
weight losses depending on the price elasticity of supply and demand. Producer
surplus may also change to a different degree across sectors – thus policies aimed
at the reallocation of resources will inevitably have distributional effects as well.
This redistribution can lead to rent-seeking by individual sectors, to the detriment
of the welfare of other sectors and even the entire economy.
The three analyses are centred around the heterogeneity of price developments
across products and industries, using panel econometric methods. My goal is
to document the magnitude of heterogeneity, to reveal their causes (which are
frequently unknown), and to draw policy-relevant conclusions.
The relationship between price and real convergence The first study as-
sesses the long-term determinants of prices: price convergence across countries
and the role of real convergence. Real convergence affects product categories dif-
ferently; various explanations are proposed. Based on the estimates I calculate the
equilibrium inflation differential between goods and services during the process of
real convergence.
Several studies have investigated the Balassa-Samuelson effect – which offers
an explanation for heterogeneous price developments in the traded and nontraded
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sectors – in Central Eastern Europe. An exhaustive literature survey is offered by
E´gert et al. (2006). More recent papers find that the Balassa-Samuelson effect
induces only 0-1 per cent extra inflation; the authors of these papers generally
look for other explanations (e.g. product quality, regulated prices) to explain
price convergence.
Economic growth also coincides with improvements in the quality of consumed
products. Better quality means higher consumer utility, which can translate
into higher prices. Due to the limitations of price statistics, quality changes are
mostly accounted for as price increases. Filer and Hanousek (2002) and Filer and
Hanousek (2003) use Romanian and Czech survey data to estimate that half of
the observed inflation in the 1990s might have been attributed to quality changes.
Backe´ et al. (2003), e´s Cincibuch and Podpiera (2006) argue that quality improve-
ments led to improving terms of trade (in other words, increasing traded prices)
in Central Eastern Europe.
Product quality is not determined by technology only. It also depends on the
income of consumers. If the price elasticity of demand differs across countries,
profit-maximizing oligopolists can apply third-degree price discrimination just as
a monopolist would do (Neven and Phlips (1985), Holmes (1989)). Price discrim-
ination could be of particular relevance in explaining price differences between rich
and poor countries.
Pricing strategies can also affect price convergence in sectors where consumers
face switching costs (e.g. telecommunication, finance). Farrell and Klemperer
(2007) show that prices can be lower in fast-growing markets. Firms set low ini-
tial prices to lure more consumers. Later, they can charge higher prices because
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switching costs ”capture” consumers. Thus, in fast-growing economies where mar-
ket penetration is still low, prices can be temporarily lower than in more mature
markets.
Consumer preferences also play a role in price convergence. In the model of
Bergstrand (1991) a minimum amount of traded and nontraded products must be
consumed by households (e.g. for subsistence). With such a utility function the
relative demand of traded and nontraded products will be a function of income.
If the share of non-tradables rises with the income level (i.e. they are luxury
products), then richer countries will have higher price levels. The situation of
Central Eastern European economies may be the exact opposite: as living stand-
ards improve, consumers may first satistfy their demand for industrial products,
as they aim to copy Western European consumption patterns and build up their
stock of durables (e.g. household appliances, cars); see e.g Garc´ıa-Solanes et al.
(2007)).
Price developments in post-socialist economies are strongly influenced by regu-
lated prices. In the socialist system many basic services (e.g. energy) were supplied
at artificially low prices. Liberalization during the transition process raised the
cost of these services (at least until ”realistic” cost levels), which transmitted into
other products’ prices, because items falling under price control are often used as
inputs in production (e.g. energy). MacDonald and Wo´jcik (2004) argue that reg-
ulated prices had a more profound effect on real exchange rates in Central Eastern
Europe than the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
However, real convergence can also reduce prices through various channels. The
theoretical and empirical literature broadly shares the view that stronger compet-
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ition raises productivity (at incumbents, Caves (1992)), enhances the productivity
growth of new entrants (Nickell (1996)), which allows firms to reduce their prices.
Network industries play a prominent role. Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001) find that
liberalization in the telecommunication sector led to higher productivity and qual-
ity, as well as lower prices. Furthermore, even the prospect of stronger competition
had a significant effect on prices. A study by ECB (2001) finds that the liberal-
ization and deregulation of telecommunication and electricity supply (until 2001)
contributed to lower prices across the economy due to input-output linkages.
The productivity of wholesale and retail trade plays an important part because
the markup of retailers can exceed 40 per cent of final producer prices. Thus, the
efficiency and competitiveness of this sector can have a strong impact on consumer
prices. Basker (2005) finds that the entry of low-cost Wal-Mart stores can reduce
prices in the U.S. by 1.5-3 per cent in the short term, and by as much as 10 per
cent in the longer term.
The price effects of EU enlargement The second study quantifies the im-
pact of a single event, the 2004 EU enlargement on prices with panel econometric
techniques. Several manufacturing subsectors in the new EU member states ex-
perienced significant price drops before EU accession. Many authors find that free
trade agreements boost trade through the reduction of transaction costs. Nahuis
(2004) finds that trade between EU members exceeds by 33-73 per cent the trade
flows with comparable non-EU countries. He estimates that EU accession reduces
trade costs with EU members by as much as 10 per cent. The effects of integration
on trade flows appear even larger if the endogeneity of trade agreements is accoun-
ted for. As Baier et al. (2008) show, trade flows can rise by as much as 127-146
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per cent 10-15 years after EU accession. Such increases in trade flows can have a
significant effect on prices through the rise in competitive pressure from imports.
A number of papers find evidence that trade liberalization enhances domestic
productivity, reduces markups and prices. Pavcnik (2004) or Amiti and Konings
(2007) demonstrate the productivity effects of liberalization on firm-level data.
A´lvarez and Lo´pez (2008) uses industry-level data from 46 countries to show that
markups fall for three years after trade liberalization. Chen et al. (2009) find a sig-
nificant (although small) negative effect of import competition on prices in Western
European countries in the 1990s. On the other hand, Romalis (2007) demonstrates
on product-level data that although NAFTA and CUSFTA significantly increased
trade flows, their impact on prices was negligible. In some protected sectors, prices
even rose as imports from third countries were limited.
In the case of the European Single Market, other mechanisms can also reduce
prices. Besides the free movement of goods, the harmonization of product market
regulation – a kind of non-tariff barrier – may contribute to stronger competition
and lower market power of firms. Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001) find evidence for
this channel among Italian firms. New EU members can be particularly affected
by this channel. According to Marinov (2010), competition policy can have a
downward effect on prices at least as strong as trade openness in the Central
Eastern European region.
The 2004 enlargement of the European Union is an ideal natural experiment
to test the price effects of the Single Market. However, the effects of the eastern
enlargement have not been fully explored yet. Dreger et al. (2007) explained price
convergence in the enlarged EU between 1999-2005 with real convergence and
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rising import competition. In some countries import competition had significant
explanatory power for the prices of durable and semi-durable goods.
The sectoral effects of monetary policy Monetary policy affects each sector
differently.1 This heterogeneity is important for the design of monetary policy,
because its distributional effects can alter the transmission mechanism.
A number of authors have analyzed the sectoral differences in the impact of
monetary policy. Leading explanations include sectoral differences in the degree
nominal rigidities; input-output linkages across sectors; and the broad credit chan-
nel of monetary transmission. Model-based studies include Bouakez et al. (2009),
who find a significant role for price stickiness and input-output linkages in a multi-
sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices. Empirical
analyses can employ firm-level data, e.g. Gaiotti and Secchi (2006); or VAR mod-
els with sectoral data, for example Barth and Ramey (2001), Dedola and Lippi
(2005), Ganley and Salmon (1997), Hayo and Uhlenbrock (1999). In a related ap-
proach, Peersman and Smets (2005) construct a monetary shock variable in a VAR
and use it to explain output fluctuations in a country/industry panel. The general
conclusion from this literature is that heterogeneity across sectors is much larger
than across countries. In particular, the sensitivity of demand to interest rates,
and the working capital requirement of production are important determinants of
the sectoral impact of monetary policy. The latter finding lends support to the
cost channel of monetary policy: higher interest rates increase the financing costs
of firms, driving up their sales prices in the short term. In addition, there is some
1This chapter has been published in English (Pelle´nyi (2012b)) and parts of it in Hungarian
(Pelle´nyi (2012a)).
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evidence for the financial accelerator mechanism of Bernanke et al. (1996): more
vulnerable corporate balance sheets can amplify the effects of monetary policy,
especially in recessions.
2 Applied methods
The relationship between price and real convergence I perform my ana-
lysis on comparative price level data in the New Cronos database of Eurostat.
The data are available for 1999-2010 for the 27 EU member states (and some
additional countries) for national accounts aggregates and household consumption
items based on the COICOP classification. I use 12 COICOP groups for 1999-2007.
Thus, I exclude the global financial crisis and recession from the sample, because
it might distort my analysis. Prices of each item are expressed as a percentage of
the actual German price level of the item.
I first analyze the speed of price convergence for each product category. Based
on the literature I hypothetize that differences in traded goods’ prices diminish
quickly.
I estimate the following dynamic panel for each (j = 1, . . . , J) product category:
log
P
(j)
it
P
(j)
DE,t
= µ(j) + ρ(j) log
P
(j)
i,t−1
P
(j)
DE,t−1
+ u
(j)
it (1)
where P
(j)
it is the price level of product j in country i in year t relative to
the German price level (DE refers to Germany). In this model the relative price
depends on its lagged value. Absent shocks, each product can have a different
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relative price in equilibrium (µ(j)). This can be explained by different taxes and
transport costs across products.
I then analyze the effect of real economic development on prices. Development
is proxied by labour productivity in the private sector.
I estimate the following specifications to assess the impact of productivity (yit)
on prices (pijt):
pijt = µ+ βjyit + θmit + κpmrit + uijt (2a)
pijt = µ+ βj ŷ
∗
it + θmit + κpmrit + uijt (2b)
y∗it = α + φeducit + vit
pijt = λi + µj + νt + βjyit + θmit + κpmrit + uijt (2c)
∆pijt = λi + µj + βj∆yit + θ∆mit + κ∆pmrit + uijt (2d)
pijt = µj + νt + βj ŷ
∗
it + θmit + κpmrit + uijt (2e)
y∗it = α + φeducit + vit
Equation 2a (OLS) controls for the endogeneity arising from the correlation
between productivity and openness (mit) as well as product market regulation
(pmrit). Equation 2b (IV) uses instrumental variables to tackle the possible reverse
causality between productivity and prices. The instrument of productivity is the
fraction of working age population with higher education (educit). Equation 2c
(FE) controls for openness, product market regulation, as well as other, unspecified
product-, country-, and year-level heterogeneity. Equation 2d (FD) is similar,
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but is estimated in differences. If the data are nearly unit root, then the FD
estimation is more efficient. Finally, equation 2e uses instrumental variables and
also includes product and year fixed effects. Equations are estimated with OLS,
while specifications with instrumental variables are estimated with 2SLS.
The estimated parameters are then used for a simple simulation to assess the
impact of real convergence on prices. I assume a scenario where the productivity
of Hungary rises from 50 per cent of the German level to 75 per cent. I calculate
the equilibrium inflation differential due to real convergence, and quantify relative
price changes within Hungary.
The price effects of EU enlargement The purpose of my analysis is the
identification of the effects of EU enlargement on producer prices. To answer this
question, I need an estimable model which takes into account the main factors in-
fluencing firms’ pricing behaviour. I use the framework of Bugamelli et al. (2010),
where under imperfect competition, the optimal price is the sum of marginal cost
and the markup. Thus the empirical analysis controls for changes in these factors.
Price data for NACE 2 industries were obtained from the New Cronos data-
base of Eurostat. Control variables – wage cost (nulcijt), cost of capital (ririt),
intermediate input prices (P INTijt ), demand (cuijt), exchange rate (fxit), product
market competition (pmrit) – were collected from Eurostat and the OECD STAN
database.
I estimate the following model:
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∆Pijt =
2006∑
k=2001
(
δkD
EU
i,t−k
)
+ µij + β1∆nulcijt + β2∆ririt + ∆P
INT
ijt +
+ γ1∆cuijt + γ2∆fxit + γ3∆imppenijt + γ4∆pmrit + εijt (3)
EU integration could have led to falling prices through at least three channels:
• The reduction of trade barriers could have intensified trade, which may have
led to productivity gains and lower markups. This channel can be captured
by the import penetration variable.
• The adoption of product market regulation in the EU (part of the acquis
communautaire) may have led to more intense competition as well. This
effect can be captured by the product market regulation variable.
• Finally, both lower trade barriers and stronger competition could have con-
tributed to lower input prices.
In order to assess the relative importance of these channels, I reestimate equa-
tion 3 omitting the three relevant variables (imppenijt, pmrit, P
INT
ijt ) one by one.
If these variables capture a relevant explanation of falling prices, then the mag-
nitude and significance of the estimated parameters of EU accession dummies
(DEUi ) should change. As a robustness check I also run regressions on sectoral
profitability, measured either as the capital share (gross operating surplus per
value added) or as the price-cost margin (gross sales/variable costs, where the
variable costs include intermediate products and labour costs).
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The sectoral effects of monetary policy This paper explores the sectoral het-
erogeneity of monetary transmission in Hungary, using a structural factor model,
where aggregate shocks are identified using sign restrictions.The structural factor
model of Forni et al. (2009) is a useful tool for this purpose. It is essentially data-
driven, and can generate ”stylized facts” without too many theoretic restrictions.
It uses a large cross-section of easily available macroeconomic time series; and all
impulse responses are estimated jointly.
I associate the industry-level impulse responses of the model with sector-specific
characteristics. These sectoral indicators aim to capture the role of various chan-
nels of the monetary transmission mechanism.
3 Results of the thesis
The relationship between price and real convergence
• The average half-life across product categories is 7.6 years. The heterogen-
eity across products is significant. There is no convergence for alcohol and
tobacco, possibly due to high and time-varying excise duties. The prices
of household furnishings also converge slowly. On the other hand, clothes
prices equalize rapidly. Similarly fast convergence is observed in postal and
telecommunications services as well as education (although with large uncer-
tainty in the last case). Other services are characterized by more persistent
price differences. Food prices also show persistent differences across coun-
tries.
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• Real convergence has a different effect on prices across product categories.
The strongest effect appears for housing, education and health services. The
Balassa-Samuelson effect and price controls can play a prominent role in
these sectors. Most industrial goods are weakly affected by real convergence,
although the coefficients are significantly different from zero (in contrast with
the law of one price). The weakest effect appears for post and telecommu-
nications, which might be a result of earlier liberalization in more developed
countries.
• I quantify the equilibrium inflation differential based on the estimates. A
1 percentage real convergence can lead to 0.25-0.5 percentage points higher
inflation per year.
• I also simulate the relative price change of goods and services. Along the
convergence path described above, the difference between the inflation rate
of services and traded goods can by approx. 0.3 percentage points higher
than in Germany.
The price effects of EU enlargement
• A wide range of industries experienced significant price decreases in the new
EU member states in the years before enlargement. Most of the price re-
duction occured in 2002, just as most new EU members had completed the
adoption of EU law. This suggests that falling prices were not related to the
act of EU accession, but to trade integration, most of which had taken place
before 2004.
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• The price reduction remains significant if import penetration and product
market regulation are controlled for. However, if changes of intermediate
product prices are also taken into account, the parameters of the EU acces-
sion dummies become insignificant. This result suggests that access to cheap
inputs played a major role in falling prices. The importance of intermediate
product prices remains if its measurement error or the possibility of reverse
causality between output and input prices are taken care of.
• Finally, sectoral profitability fel substantially during EU accession. In addi-
tion to falling input prices, stronger competition may have also contributed
to falling producer prices. Foreign competition was not necessarily posed by
old EU members however; competitive pressure from emerging Asian eco-
nomies (especially China) could have also increased during the time of EU
accession.
The sectoral effects of monetary policy
• The estimated model provides a reasonable description of monetary trans-
mission, and the role of aggregate disturbances in the Hungarian economy.
• The results strongly suggest that each sector reacts differently to monetary
shocks. The output response of industry, construction and trade are partic-
ularly strong.
• Within manufacturing, subsectors producing durable goods respond more to
a monetary expansion. This suggests that the interest sensitivity of demand
can differ across sectors.
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• Furthermore, industries with a stronger reliance on external financing also
benefit more from a monetary expansion.
• Prices increase less in sectors using more credit and with stronger balance
sheets, thanks to their falling borrowing costs. This ”cost channel” works
against other transmission channels of monetary policy because it reduces
prices after a monetary expansion (making it a plausible explanation for the
”price puzzle” of monetary VARs).
• Finally, the response of sectoral output and prices is negatively correlated,
which hints at different degrees of price rigidity across industries.
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